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Abstract 
Wolfram, D.A., A semantics for 2Prolog, Theoretical Computer Science 136 (1994) 277 289. 
We give a model-theoretic semantics for the logic of higher-order Horn clauses, the basis of a form of 
the 2Prolog higher-order logic programming language. We define certain intensional general models 
and show that higher-order Horn clause logic is sound and complete with respect to them. 
1. The 2Prolog logics 
A major design goal of the 2Prolog project is to provide a rigorous understanding 
of programming languages which are based on a form of Church's simply typed 
)~-calculus formulation of the Simple Theory of Types [17]. These languages extend 
first-order logic programming; they allow quantified predicate and function variables 
and 2 abstractions in terms, and operationally they resemble SLD-resolution [5]. 
The applications of )~Prolog include specifying and implementing theorem provers 
for a variety of logics [6], applications in computational linguistics [-13], syntactic 
transformations [14], and type inference [18]. 
It is often simpler to view a first-order Horn clause interpreter as a constructor of 
sequent calculus proofs, rather than an SLD-resolution refuter. Similarly, a 2Prolog 
interpreter constructs proofs of sequent calculi provided that no extra-logical features, 
such as the cut, are used. The logics of these calculi form a hierarchy (see Fig. 1). 
The most general ogic in this outline is hohh, or that of higher-order hereditary 
Harrop formulas [15] which are related to first-order formulas discussed by Harrop 
[7]. The hohh logic allows implications to be present in goal formulas and the bodies 
of clauses. 
Special cases of hohh are the La logic [11], and hohc or higher-order Horn clauses 
[17]. The former also allows such implications, but restrictions on terms ensure that 
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Fig. 1. The 2Prolog logic hierarchy. 
all higher-order unification problems [9] which arise are decidable ones. This is not 
the case for the hohc logic where there are no such implications or restrictions on 
terms. The logic fohc or first-order Horn clauses is a special case both of L~ and hohc. 
Other special cases in the hierarchy have been discussed by Miller [12]. 
There is a well-known model-theoretic semantics for fohc [5], and one has more 
recently been defined for L~ [12]. Model-theoretic semantics for hohh and hohc do 
not seem to have been defined. In this paper, we show that the hohc logic is sound and 
complete with respect o certain intensional general models. This provides a model- 
theoretic semantics for a form of ).Prolog [17]. 
1.1. The hohc logic 
We call the higher-order Horn clause logic, the hohc logic. This logic is based on 
Church's simply typed ),-calculus formulation of the Simple Theory of Types [4]. 
Definition 1.1. The base types of the hohc logic are the type t of individuals, and the 
type o of propositions. 
Definition 1.2. The primitive symbols of the hohc logic are: 
• the logical constant symbols V, 3, ix, v ,  ~,  and T, 
• countably infinite parameters where there is at least one parameter of each type, 
and 
• countably infinite variables where there is at least one variable of each type. 
Definition 1.3. A signature 50 of the hohc logic is a set of constant symbols which 
contains the logical constants of the hohc logic 
A semanticsJor ;,.Prolog 279 
The terms of the hohc logic are in a normal form in which fl- and 0-redexes do not 
occur. A 0-redex is a subterm of the form t where the type of t is not a base type. It can 
be converted to the term ;tx. t(x) provided that x is not a free variable in t. The strong 
normalization and Church-Rosser properties hold for the simply typed 2-calculus 
with fir-conversion so that every term of this calculus has a ri0-normal form which is 
unique up to :~-conversion. 
Definition 1.4. The terms of the hohc logic over a signature 5~ are the elements of the 
collection of all well-formed simply typed )v-terms in ri0-normal form whose primitive 
symbols are just those of the hohc logic provided that all constant symbols occurring 
in those terms are elements of 5,0. 
A G-term of the hohc logic over a signature 5'~ is a term of the hohc logic which does 
not contain V or ~.  
Remark 1.5. In the following, we shall assume that all terms are terms of the hohc 
logic over a fixed signature 5P, and will not always refer to 5 e. 
Definition 1.6. An atomic formula of the hohc logic is a term of the hohc logic whose 
type is o, and whose head is either a parameter or a variable. 
An atomic formula whose head is a parameter is called a rigid atomic formula. An 
atomic formula whose head is a variable is called a flexible atomic formula. 
Notation 1.7. The notations Vx. A and 3x.A abbreviate V2x. A and 32x.A, respectively. 
Definition 1.8. A formula or D-formula of the hohc logic is an element of the collection 
of terms of the hohc logic which are defined by the first production below. A goal 
formula or G-formula is an element of the collection of terms of the hohc logic which 
are defined by the second production below: 
D : := G~A r [ D IAD 2 ] Vx.D 
G : := T [ A [ G1AG2 [ G lvG2 [ 3x.G 
where Ar is any rigid atomic formula, A is an atomic formula, G, G1 and G2 are 
G-formulas, and D, D1 and D2 are D-formulas. 
We use -1- ~ Ar as a D-formula instead of just A, because this simplifies Definition 
2.13 in Section 2.2 below. Definitions of hohc include Ar as a D-formula [15, 17]. We 
also do not use l as a logical constant in keeping with Miller et al. [-15]. These do not 
lead to any loss of generality. 
Definition 1.9. A sequent is a relation of the form F-~B, where F is a finite set of closed 
terms whose fl0-normal forms are D-formulas, and the fl0-normal form of B is 
a G-formula. An initial sequent has the form F~T.  
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Notation 1.10. Notations of the form B, F and B, C, F occurring in a sequent respec- 
tively abbreviate {S} wF, and {B} w {C} uF.  
Definition 1.11. A rule of inference is a relation between a finite collection of sequents, 
and a sequent. It has the form 
sequent a ... sequenG 
sequent 
where n >~ 0. The sequenti are called antecedents where 1 ~<i~< n, and sequent is called 
the succedent. 
Definition 1.12. The rules of inference of the hohc logic follow below. 
V-L: Provided that t is a G-term, 
(2x.B t), F oC  
Vx.B, F~C 
A-L: Provided that A is an atomic formula, 
B, C, FoA  
B A C, FoA  
~-L: Provided that A is an atomic formula, 
FoB T ~ C, F-~A 
B~C,  FoA 
3-R: Provided that t is a G-term, 
F o (2x .B  t) 











f t  .__~ Bt 
FoB 
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where B' =e,B and each formula C' in F'  either occurs in F, or has been replaced by 
a formula C in F where C' =~C.  
Backchain: 
BDC, F~B 
B~C,F- - .C 
Informally, the combined effects of applying the V-L, q-R, 2, and A-R, and 
Backchain rules of inference include that of the higher-order unification [9] of the 
head of a clause with a formula in the body of a clause. 
Definition 1.13. A proofofa sequent F~B is a finite tree constructed only by using the 
rules of inference of Definition 1.12. Its root is labelled by F~B and all of its leaves are 
above the root and are labelled by initial sequents. 
A partial proof of a sequent F~B is a tree which is constructed in the same way as 
a proof of F~B except hat its leaves are not necessarily labelled by initial sequents. 
Notation 1.14. We write [-F~B if there is a proof of F~B. 
Definition 1.13 is related to that of uniform proof [15-]. The major difference is that 
uniform proofs do not use the Backchain rule of inference. This rule is included to 
allow proofs of sequents of the form F~A, where A is an atomic formula. 
2. Semantics 
In 1950, Henkin [8] gave a completeness theorem for the Simple Theory of Types, 
but it assumed that the axioms of functional extensionality were valid in the general 
models he defined. These axioms have the form: 
Vx(f(x) = g(x)) ~f= g, 
where ~( f )=~(g)=( f l~) ,  and ~(x)=fl. The proof of this completeness result was 
corrected by Andrews [2] to ensure that the axioms are valid. 
The logic hohc does not assume that they are valid. If it did, the goal ?-r q. would 
succeed with the following 2Prolog program, instead of failing. 
pX:  qX .  
qX  : -pX .  
rp .  
This implies that the Henkin-Andrews general models are unsuitable as the 
semantic basis for the hohc logic. In this section, we define certain intensional 
general models and show that the hohc logic is sound and complete with respect o 
them. 
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A survey of the literature shows that there does not seem to be an intensional 
version of the Henkin-Andrews completeness result [2, 8] which is suitable for the 
hohc logic. 
Takahashi [22] and Prawitz [19] independently resolved Takeuti's conjecture [23] 
which states that a form of cut-elimination holds for the Simple Theory of Types. 
Their proofs constructed models for a logic defined by Schfitte [20]. SchiJtte [21] later 
summarized these results. This logic differs from the hohc logic because it only permits 
abstractions of the form ,~xl .... 2x,.A where A has type o. 
Takeuti [24] subsequently proved his conjecture for an extensional, and an inten- 
sional calculus but with the restrictions that variables and abstractions are monadic, 
and there are no constant symbols. 
Andrews [1] gave a soundness result for the intensional Simple Theory of Types, 
but apparently not a completeness result. Mitchell and Moggi [16] defined Kripke 
models where each world is an extensional general model for a higher-order equa- 
tional logic which differs from the hohc logic. 
None of the models defined in these works seems to be suitable for the semantics of 
the hohc logic, 
2.1. Intensional general models 
We now present he semantics of the simply typed 2-calculus formulation of the 
intensional Simple Theory of Types. Some of the definitions below draw ideas from 
Andrews' V-complexes [1]. 
We refer the reader to Andrews [3] for an introduction to higher-order logic and 
general models, and begin by defining the domains of the frames of intensional general 
models, In the following, for simplicity we use the convention of treating s-variants of 
a term as if they are all the same. 
Definition 2.1. For each type symbol 7, the elements of the set ~ are pairs of the form 
(B, p) where B is a G-term. The domain ~ is defined as follows: 
• For every G-formula B, there exists just one element of the form (B, p )e~o where 
p is either the truth value t or the truth value f. 
• (B, ~)e~, if and only if B is a G-term of type ~. 
• (B, p)e~(~_~) if and only if B is a G-term of type (e--,fl), and p is a function from 
@~ to ~ such that if (C, q) is any element of @,, then p(C, q)  is (E, pq) where 
E is a fl6-normal form of (B C). 
We now show that the flame of an intensional general model is well-defined. 
Lemma 2.2. For each G-term B of type 7, there is a unique p such that (B, p)e~.  
Proof. The proof is by induction on types. The result follows from Definition 2.1 when 
7 is either o or 1. If7 has the form (c~-,/3) then p maps each (C, q )~ to (E, r )e~,  
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where E is a riO-normal form of(B C). By the induction hypothesis, we have that q and 
r are unique, so that p is also unique. [] 
It is now possible to see how the axioms of functional extensionality need not be 
valid in general models with such frames. There could be two distinct elements (A, p) 
and (B, q)  in the same domain of a frame, where the type of A and B is (~ ~ri), and yet 
for every element (C, r) in @~ of that frame p(C,  r) is the same element in ~ of that 
frame as q <C, r). 
Definition 2.3. An assignment is a function ~b which maps each variable x of type "/to 
an element ~bx of ~,,. This element is denoted by (~blx, ~b2x>. 
Next we define the denotations of the logical constants. 
Definition 2.4. The denotation function J is defined for the logical constant symbols 
3, A, v ,  and T as follows: 
• J9  is (3, P)e~((~oo)~o) where p maps every element <2x.B,q)~(~o) to 
<92x.B, r )e~o.  If q maps at least one element (C, s )e@,  to (E, t)E@o where 
E is a riO-normal form of (2x. B C), then r is t. If q does not have this property, then 
risf. 
• J /x  is (A ,  p )~(  . . . . .  ) where p maps every (B, f )e~o to (/xB, q)e~o~o) .  The 
function q maps every element (C, r )~o  to (/x BC, f)e@o. The function o maps 
every (B , t )~o to ( / ,B,s)~o~o) where s maps every (C , r )e~o to 
( /', BC, r)e~o. 
• jv  is ( v ,  p )~(  . . . . .  ) where p maps every <B, f )~o  to ( vB,  q)e~(o~o). The 
function q maps every element (C, r )e~o to ( v BC, r )e~o.  The function p maps 
every (B,t )e@o to <vB, s)e@(o~o) where s maps every (C,r )e@o to 
( v BC, t>~o.  
• JT  is (T,  t). 
Definition 2.5. For each assignment ~b and G-term B of type 7, a valuation function Y/', 
maps B to an element in ~ which is denoted by (~//~B, Y/'~B). 
We now define interpretations over a signature. 
Definition 2.6. Given a frame {c~,)~, for any constant ce5 ° of type ~, there is a unique 
(c, p)  in @,. We define J c  to be (c, p). The denotations of the logical constants 
3, A, v and Y were given in Definition 2.4. The pair ({~,}, ,  J )  is called an 
interpretation ver the signature 5e. 
The definition of intensional general models below uses particular sets of G- 
formulas. 
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Definition 2.7. Let Z¢ be a set of G-formulas in r/0-normal form over a signature 5 ~. 
The set J f  is called consistent provided that all of the following conditions hold: 
• T~[ .  
• G1A G2~Jt  ~ if and only if G~6Jcg and G26~.  
• G~ v G2e~ if and only if 9f(~ {G1, G2} ¢:0. 
• ~x.G~ if and only if there is a G-term t such that the ri0-normal form of(2x.G t) 
is an element of Jrg. 
Theorem 2.8. Let ~ be a consistent set of G-formulas. ~t ~ uniquely characterizes an 
intensional general model ~t' = ({~}=,  J )  where B~3¢( if and only if (B, t )~o of ~g. 
Proof. The set ~o can be uniquely defined from J¢: for every G-formula B, if B is not 
in ~ then {B, f)E@o. 
By Definition 2.1, ~, is unique, so that by Lemma 2.2, we have that {@,}~ is also 
uniquely defined. 
We now define a valuation function ~U+ where ~b is an assignment into the frame 
{@~}=, and show that it satisfies the conditions for Jr' to be a general model. 
If x is a variable of type "/ then 3¢'~x is defined to be ~bx. We have ~bxe~ by 
Definition 2.3, as required. 
If c is a logical constant symbol or a parameter of type 7 then ~/F,c is defined to be 
Jc .  We have J ce~ by Definition 2.6 of J above and Definition 2.7 of ~ .  
More generally, if B is a G-term of type "/and the set of all free variables occurring in 
B is {Xx ..... x,}, then "U~B is defined to be a ri0-normal form of 
(...((;.xl....~x,.BdF xl)gF x2)-"qSlx,). 
We now define ~JB ,  and verify that ~ v .  
Suppose that B is an application of the form (C E) where C has type (c~fl) and 
E has type cc By induction we have ~'~C~@(~a~, and ~E~@~.  We define ~(CE)  
to be the second component of V~,C(~E) .  
By Definition 2.1, we have that the first component of ~,~C(~/'~E) is a ri0-normal 
form of (~C ~E) .  But by the Church-Rosser property of ri~-conversion we have 
that this term is ~,~(C E). Therefore, ~B = ~C(~E) ,  which is an element of@a by 
Definition 2.1 as required. 
Suppose that B is an abstraction of the form 2x. C, where the type of x is cq and the 
type of C is 13. Let ~,;,.x.C be the function from @= to ~a which for every d~ maps 
d to ~ C where @ is the same as q) except hat 4,x = d. By structural induction, ~ C is 
an element of @~. By Lemma 2.2, there is no other element in ~ of the form 
(YF~ C, r). 
Suppose that d is an element {E, q). We defined above that ~K',~(2x.C) is a 
tiff-normal form of (...(),x1...,J, Xn.(,,~x.C)~lXx).-.~lxn) where {xl .... x,} is the set 
of free variables in 2x.C. Hence, f~C is a ri0-normal form of 
((...((2x~...)~x,2x.C)do~x~)...dAx,)E). This is an c~-variant of the ri0-normal form of 
( f~(2x. C)E), in accordance with Definition 2.1. 
A semantics for 2Prolo 9 285 
By Lemma 2.2, there is a unique element (~e'~2x.C, p )e~,~p) .  We have shown 
above that p is extensionally equal to 2U~2x.C, so that ~,2x .C  is (~e-~2x.C, p), and 
therefore U¢2x.Ce~,,p) ,  as required. [] 
Remark 2.9. From now on, all general models are intensional general models over 
a fixed signature 6e. 
The following definitions and notations are based on those for the Simple Theory of 
Types [3, 8]. 
Definition 2.10. Let t be a formula, and J /be  a general model. 
• t is satisfiable in ~ '  if and only if there is an assignment ~b into dg such that 
~/f~t =t. 
• t is valid in J / i f  and only if for every assignment ~b into ~' ,  ~~t=t.  
• t is valid if and only if it is valid in every general model de'. 
Notation 2.11. We write 
• J /~  t to indicate t is valid in Jg, 
• ~ t to indicate t is valid. 
2.2. Completeness 
In logic programming terms, P in a sequent corresponds to a logic program and 
a clause of the form G ~ Ar  corresponds to an instantiation of a program clause. We 
now define the clauses which correspond to all of the instantiations of program 
clauses of a particular program. 
Definition 2.12. A D-formula G = A r is called a clause of P if and only if there is 
a partial proof whose root has the form F~Go and which contains a sequent of the 
form G ~ Ar, A-'-~Gk. 
Definition 2.12 is used in part of Definition 2.13 below to define the validity of F in 
a general model. Informally, we are identifying the validity of a program in a model 
with the validity in that model of all of its instantiated clauses. 
Definition 2.13. Suppose that F~B is a sequent, and J / i s  a general model. 
• J /~  F holds if and only if for all clauses of F of the form G ~ At, we have s/¢ ~ G 
implies dr' ]-=- Ar. 
• Jg ~ F~B if and only if s/g ~ F implies de' ~ B. 
• If for all general models d, /we have J /~  F~B we write ~ F--*B. 
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Theorem 2.14. I f  ~ F-*B then ~-F~B. 
Proof. Let ~ff be the set of all G-formulas uch that BE~(, ~ if and only if there is a proof 
of F-~B. It can be shown by structural induction on B that ~ is consistent in 
accordance with Definition 2.7. If B has the form T then clearly there is a proof of 
F -~T and (-r, t>eJt% If B~,~,¢ has the form Ga A Gz, then by definition there are 
proofs of F-~G~, and F--*G2, so that G~e~ and G2~ '~. Similar observations hold 
when B has the form G~ v G2, or 9x.G. 
By Theorem 2.8, ~ characterizes a unique general model ~ '  where <B, t>~@o of 
s / / i f  and only if B~.  
For every assignment ~b into the frame of J4, we have that ~B is an instance 
of B, say BO for some substitution 0 by the proof of Theorem 2.8. From the 
proof of F~B we can construct a proof of F~BO by replacing the G-term t in 
applications of the V-L rule of inference by tO. Hence BOegtg, and by Definition 2.10 
we have ~ '  [= B. 
We now show that ~ '  ~ F. If G D A~ is a clause of F, and there is a proof of F~Ar, 
then A~ and G are elements of ~ ,  and so Jg" ~ Ar and ~# ]= G. If there is not a proof of 
F--*A~ then A~q~JtC Similarly, we have G¢oUg. In both cases, the condition in the first 
part of Definition 2.13 is always met, as required. 
By Definition 2.13, de' ~ B because ~/' ~ F--,B and J ]  ~ F. Therefore, BeOff, and 
so ~-F--,B, as required. _~ 
Example 2.15. We shall use the 2Prolog program from Section 2: 
pX  : qX .  
qX  : -pX .  
rp .  
These clauses correspond to a set F of D-formulas: 
{Vx.(q(x) ~ p(x)), (Tm r()%p(y))) A (Vx.(p(x) ~ q(x)))}, 
where r(x) = ~, r(r) = ((~ ~o)~o)  and r(p) = (~--*o). 
In the model constructed in the proof of Theorem 2.14, there are distinct elements 
<2y.q(y), d> and (2y.p(y), e> in ~(~o) where d and e are extensionally equal. These 
elements could not be distinct in a general model in which the axioms of functional 
extensionality are valid. 
We also have {r(2y.p(y)), t>e@o, because there is a proof of F~r(2y.p(y)). How- 
ever, {r(2y.q(y)), f>e@o. This is possible because the axioms of functional exten- 
sionality do not hold in the constructed model. The second component of the 
denotation of r in @~(~o)~o) can be defined so that it maps the elements N(~o~, which 
were mentioned above, in this way. 
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2.3. Soundness 
We now prove the converse of Theorem 2.14. 
Theorem 2.16. U" RF ~B then ~ F ~B. 
Proof. The proof shows that for each rule of inference used in the proofofa  sequent, if
the antecedents of the rule are valid in a model, then the succedent sequent of the rule 
must be valid in that model. The result then follows by structural induction on proofs 
and the observation that all initial sequents are valid. 
The only relatively difficult case is the proof for the D-L rule of inference: 
F~B T ~ C, F~A 
B~C,F~A 
If ~ B ~ C, F~A then there is a model J{ such that Jg" ~ B ~ C, F and J /~# A. 
From the assumption that ~ T ~ C, F~A,  follows that Jg ~# Y ~ C, F. 
We have d¢'~ F~B from the assumption that ~ F~B.  There is one case to 
consider, ~ ~ F and ~ ~ B, because the clauses of F are a subset of those of 
B = C, F, and .4t I= B ~ C, F. 
It is easy to see that ~ ~# T = C and so J / t#  C. From Jg ~ B D C, F, it follows that 
Jg I# B, which is a contradiction. 
Therefore, ~ B ~ C, F ~ A, as required. [] 
2.4. Uniform proofs 
Corollary 2.17. There is a uniform proof of a sequent F~B implies ~ F~B.  
Proof. A uniform proof of a sequent F~B uses all of the rules of inference 
of Definition 1.11 except for Backchain [15]. Theorem 2.16 also holds for this 
case. [] 
3. Discussion 
We have given a model-theoretic semantics for the logic of higher-order Horn 
clauses [-17]. This logic is the basis of a form of the higher-order logic programming 
language 2Prolog. The models we defined are certain intensional general models, and 
we showed that the higher-order Horn clause logic is sound and complete with respect 
to them. Our soundness proof implies that uniform proofs [15] with this logic are also 
sound. 
The problem of giving a model-theoretic semantics to higher-order hereditary 
Harrop clauses remains. This logic is also an intensional one, but deductions with 
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formulas with embedded implications will require a different model theory to be used. 
One possibility is that of Kripke's "possible world" semantics [10] where each world 
is an intensional general model. 
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